Safety measures concerning the Coronavirus COVID-19. Read more about the measures.

x

Yasin Mimir

Yasin Mimir
Function/Position
Senior Economist, Economic and Market Analysis

Yasin Mimir is a Senior Economist at the Economic and Market Analysis division at the ESM. Before joining the ESM, he worked in different positions at the Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Departments of the Central Bank of Norway, recently being a Principal Economist in the Modelling division. He also worked as a Research Economist at the Central Bank of Turkey. He served as an external expert at the IMF and as a member of the Research Task Force Macro Modelling work stream at the BIS. He held visiting research fellowships at the BIS and the Federal Reserve Board.

He received his PhD in Economics from the University of Maryland in the US and his current work mainly focuses on monetary and macroprudential policies, banking and international finance. He has published his work in several academic journals including International Journal of Central Banking, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, and B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics.

Yasin Mimir on Linkedin

List of publications

Personal website

Working papers

Fear (no more) of Floating: Asset Purchases and Exchange Rate Dynamics
Leaning against persistent financial cycles with occasional crises

My working papers

Yasin Mimir
WP 56 cover
Working papers

Leaning against persistent financial cycles with occasional crises

We study conditions under which a leaning against the wind (LAW)-type monetary policy is advisable to address risks to financial stability. We do so within a regime-switching dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with endogenous crises and persistent financial cycles based on partly backward-looking house price beliefs. Under empirically plausible financial cycles, LAW increases inflation volatility because it amplifies the effects of supply shocks on inflation. It also leads to a lower average inflation, resulting in more frequent episodes of a binding lower bound on interest rates. LAW is advisable only if (i) the central bank puts more weight on output stability or (ii) financial cycles are less persistent than observed.
Show all