Should EMU's fiscal framework be reformed and if so, how?

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
DG ECFIN, European Commission
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The Maastricht fiscal framework

- EU fiscal rules: de facto "constrained discretion"
- Focus on sustainability/stability:
 - Avoidance of excessive deficits, focus on gross errors
 - No initial concern for cyclicality
 - Sanctions, but political process
 - ≠ classical infringement procedures
- No bail out rule: hope in market discipline and TINA

The SGP history: searching for the right mix



SGP reforms reflecting an evolving view of fiscal policy in EMU

Conventional view on fiscal policies in EMU – pre crisis



"Put own house in order..."

- Rules to tame deficit bias in absence of national exchange rate policy
- Automatic stabilisers: let them play
- Risk of debt monetisation dominates monetary-fiscal relations
- Low spillovers because of offsetting monetary policy reaction
- Threat of financial sanctions helps discipline governments
- Negative coordination suffices

Revising the role of fiscal policy in EMU – post crisis



"...and strengthen the joint foundation"

- Discretionary fiscal policy needed in case of large shocks
- High multipliers and spillovers when monetary policy is constrained
- Aggregate fiscal stance and differentiated fiscal space matter
- Sovereign-banks nexus
- Institutions / rules / markets
- Links fiscal policies/ structural reforms
- Difficult to sanction sovereign states

Overall assessment of the SGP experience

A glass half-filled?

- SGP partially disciplined policies
- EA position sound overall but fragilities in some MS
- Some pro-cyclical tendencies
- From multilateral to bilateral surveillance mode

Unsolved issues

- Limited enforcement mechanisms
- No tool for influencing aggregate stance
- QPF underrated

Political economy not evolving favourably

Erosion of consensus, polarisation of views

Components of a minimum fiscal union balanced with elements of decentralisation

Elements of centralisation

Elements of decentralisation

Simplified fiscal rules

National rules nested with EU rules

Common fiscal capacity

Some strengthening of national fiscal institutions

Reinforced ability to intervene in case of gross errors


Reinforced market discipline

Full fiscal federalism

No EU rules

The SGP trilemma

Efficacy optimum not yet achieved...



Some conclusions

- The latest incarnation of fiscal framework has given considerably more weight to growth concerns
- For the medium-term, there are three conceivable avenues:
 - (1) Make the best use of the present framework
 - (2) Improve the fiscal rules
 - (3) Take steps towards fiscal union
- The steps are non-exclusive, even complementary:
 - In the short term a credible implementation of current framework is critical to rebuild trust
 - Combining simplified rules with common stabilisation capacity would be a promising arrangement

Thank you