The EU banking sector - risks and recovery
A single market perspective

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Contents: repair and recovery in the EU banking sector

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**Recovery**
- Profitability
- Asset quality
  - A single market perspective on NPLs
  - Possible measures for dealing with NPLs
Strongly rising CET1 ratios, supported by decreasing RWA and increasing capital

The CET1 ratio has increased by 50 bps to 14.1% in Q3 2016. This effect is explained by the growth in capital (mainly driven by higher ‘retained earnings’) as well as a decrease of RWAs.

On a fully loaded basis, the CET1 ratio showed a similar development, increasing by 40 bps to 13.6% when compared to the past quarter.

Also for T1 and total capital ratios the trend was comparable.

Source for all charts: RDB (Q3 2016 data).
Strong start of banks’ funding market into the new year

- Strong funding market activity in the first two weeks of 2017: low new issuance premia, secondary market spreads slightly compressing and demand for European bank debt was very strong from investors with ample cash positions.

- Issuance activity included AT1s, T2s, senior unsecured, senior non-preferred, and covered bond issuances, from core and peripheral countries.

iTraxx financials of sen. unsec. and subord. funding.

(30 EU financials)

There was a roll-over of respective iTraxx indices on 19 / 20 September, for which reason a widening of the spreads can be seen at this date

AT1 mid yield composite (in %).

(Weighted average yield of a sample of Additional Tier 1 securities, issued by 12 EU banks)

Source for above charts: Bloomberg, EBA calculation.
Business model and impediments to sustainability

Non performing loans
- Expensive to maintain
- Misallocation of capital

Costs
- Restructuring, regulation and IT spending
- Conduct redress costs globally since 2007 estimated at more than USD 220 bn

Competition
- Fin tech = Future competition in individual services
- Peer to peer & Payments systems

Low interest rates
- Very narrow net interest margins and legacy products
- Sharp switch may do more harm!

Urgent & actionable

Long term strategic planning required

Exogenous
Costs reduction remains in banks’ focus for increasing profitability

Banks’ primary targets for increasing profitability and cost reduction measures.

Q4 You primarily target this area for increasing profitability in your bank in the next months:

- a. Net interest income
- b. Net Fees and Commissions income
- c. Other operating income
- d. Operating expenses / costs reduction
- e. Impairments
- f. Other

About one third of the banks target cost reductions as their primary target for increasing profitability, according to the results of the EBA’s Risk Assessment Questionnaire (conducted in October / November 2016).

This shall mainly be reached by reduction of overhead / staff costs as well as increasing automatisation / digitalisation (nearly 90% agreement).

Source: EBA Risk Assessment Questionnaire for banks (year end 2016).
Conduct costs remain a drag on banks’ profitability

Banks’ primary targets for increasing profitability and cost reduction measures.

- Over 44% of respondents to the EBA’s Risk Assessment Questionnaire have paid out more than EUR 500 million in compensation, litigation and similar payments since the financial year 2007/08 (according to the RAQ, as of December 2015 agreement with this statement was 42%).

- The share of banks having paid out more than EUR 1 billion further increased from 32% in the December 2015 RAQ to 37% in the December 2016 RAQ.

- 40% of the banks assume litigation costs to be heightened in the next six to twelve months.

Source for all charts: EBA Risk Assessment Questionnaire (year end 2016).
Profitability remains subdued

The annualised return on equity (RoE) in Q3 2016 decreased to 5.4%, one percentage point (p.p.) below the third quarter last year. The RoE also decreased when compared to Q2 2016 (5.7%).

Banks’ interest income (at 19.0% of banks’ equity per June 2016) is not sufficient to cover their operating expenses (at 20.9% of banks’ equity). Fees and commissions income do not grow enough to compensate for banks’ impaired capacity to generate net interest income (Q2 / RAR data).
Asset quality remains poor, with only slightly improving NPL ratio

- NPL ratio has continued the trend of previous quarters, decreasing 10 bps to 5.4% in Q3 2016.
- The coverage ratio for NPLs has improved, increasing by 50 bps to 44.3% in Q3 2016.

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**European Banks' NPL recognition faster than Japan early 90s crisis but slower than US banks**

Source: FDIC, PSA Government of Japan, World Bank, J.P. Morgan estimates for EU 2015a data. NPL ratio defined as Non Performing Loans as % of total loans.
NPLs in the EU: country breakdown (June 2016)

Source: Supervisory reporting data (Q2 2016).
More than EUR 1 trillion NPLs in the EU

10 countries with NPL ratio above 10%

Bank/sovereign link

Spill-overs

Impairment of lending channel for monetary policy

Significant differences across countries, but an EU problem

Source: Supervisory reporting data (Q2 2016).
### Breakdown of NPLs ratio by counterparty

**Percentage values.**

**Source : Supervisory reporting data (Q2 2016).**
NPLs: Market failures and market impediments

**Market failures:**

- Banks’ incentives to dispose at a loss
- Structural failures such as legal systems
- Information asymmetry between buyers and sellers
- Intertemporal pricing problem and first mover disadvantage

**Corrective actions:**

- Incentivise action through supervisory pressure and tax changes.
- Fix legal and insolvency regimes
- Consistent data, easily available to investors,
- Transparency of existing NPL deals
- Simplify and standardise legal contracts
  - Overcoming market illiquidity issues by providing price clearing at “real economic value”
A spectrum of official sector actions

Increasing public sector involvement

Data quality and consistency (NPL and collateral)
EU master agreement on NPL disposal
EU servicing regime established
Government support for platform infrastructure
Blueprint for national Asset Management Companies (AMCs)
Single EU AMC established

State aid + BRRD applies
Addressing market failures

Information asymmetry restricts entry

Consistent data
- Transparency
- Faster legal systems
- Diverse supply of NPLs

Specialised investors

Institutional investors, local investors

Coverage of NPLs

Immediate loss

Real economic value if market failures are addressed

Current market price

\[ T^0 \rightarrow T^1 \]

1 Euro

60c – net book value

40c

20c
AMC some possible features

1. Stress tests are used to identify the total envelope of potential state aid for each bank
   - e.g., capital shortfall against P2 minimum capital requirements under a three year adverse provisioning assessment reflecting stressed market prices.

2. Assessment of real economic value vs current market prices is designed, by asset class/geography.

3. The AMC is established with government support
   - AMC crowds in funds from private investors.

4. Banks transfer some agreed segments of their NPLs to the AMC at the real economic value,
   - Under due diligence from the AMC and accompanied by full data sets available to potential investors.
   - The transfer of assets to an AMC would in the first instance hit existing shareholders at any transfer price below book value.
   - The difference between current market prices and real economic value could be the theoretical extent of state aid under precautionary recap but in this interim period financed by AMC capital and private investors.

5. The AMC sets a timeline (e.g. three years) to sell the assets at the real economic value.
   - If that value is not achieved, the bank must take the full market price hit. A recapitalisation is exercised by the national government as state aid with the full conditionality that accompanies that.
FAQs

- **Are existing shareholders safeguarded?** No, they bear an immediate loss if the net book value is higher than the transfer price to the AMC (i.e. the real economic value) and are diluted if the eventual sale price is lower than the transfer price and a recapitalisation is necessary.

- **Are BRRD rules suspended?** No, the BRRD applies, in particular the concept of precautionary recap.

- **Are State aid rules ignored?** No, if the clawback clause is activated because the eventual sale price is lower than the transfer price to the AMC (i.e. the real economic value), the bank is recapitalised and State aid conditionality – including burden sharing – applies.

- **If an EU-wide AMC is established, will there be a risk of losing any EU money?** No, since if eventual sale price is lower than the transfer price to the AMC (i.e. the real economic value) a clawback clause applies.

- **Would there be burden sharing across EU countries?** No, since if the clawback clause is activated, it is the Member State injecting capital in the bank.
### Overview of the main risks and vulnerabilities

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